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Trademarks or Copyrights: 
Which Intellectual Property Right Affords Its 
Owner the Greatest Protection of Architectural 
Ingenuity? 
Rashida Y.V. MacMurray* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Imagine you are a design professional who has been commissioned to design “the” 
signature architectural masterpiece that will define your career and legacy.  You have an 
unlimited budget and have the most renowned engineering consultants at your disposal.  
You have prepared flawless architectural plans and technical specifications.  The 
construction of the building was completed under budget and ahead of schedule.  You 
deposited your architectural plans with the U.S. Copyright Office and obtained a 
certificate of copyright.  Simultaneously through trademark counsel, you filed an 
application for trademark registration of the building structure.  Subsequently, to your 
surprise, you discover that not only has a copycat building been erected across the street, 
but your architectural drawings have been copied without your permission and your 
signature title block has been removed and replaced with the name of a third party 
unaffiliated with the project.1 
¶2 What do you do? What are your remedies? Could you enjoin the construction of the 
“copycat” structure? Most importantly, how would you decide whether to enforce your 
copyright or trademark rights against the alleged infringer? The scenario above describes 
an extreme fact pattern and illustrates the dynamic intersection of architectural ingenuity 
and intellectual property law.  Many architects and other design professionals remain 
unaware that their building designs, engineering drawings, specifications, and 
construction drawings can be protected subject to the intellectual property policy 
principles under the trademark and copyright laws of the United States. 
 
* Ms. MacMurray is an Associate at Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione in Chicago, Illinois.  Ms. 
MacMurray’s practice is devoted to patents, copyrights, trademarks and construction law areas.  Ms. 
MacMurray acknowledges the assistance of Yasmin McFarlane-Vaughn, Esq. and Joseph V. Norvell, Esq. 
for their support in preparing this article. 
1 This situation is hypothetical but the facts are similar to the facts written in the following article about 
Truett Miely.  Betsy Schiffman, Copycats Architectural Copycats, FORBES.COM, at 
http://www.forbes.com/2003/10/03/cx_bs_1003home.html (last visited April 11, 2005) (Mr. Miley, a 
construction contractor, spent three years and nearly one  million dollars to build his dream house in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana.  He designed most of the structure himself.  When the walls of a new home were 
constructed approximately two hundred feet away from his own house, he was disappointed to discover 
that the neighboring property looked very familiar.). 
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¶3 In most major cities, there is usually at least one famous building that not only 
identifies the geographic area, but also characterizes the respective city’s skyline.  For 
example, in New York City, such buildings include the Empire State Building, the 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, and 5 Times Square.2  In Chicago, the list includes 
the Sears Tower and the Wrigley Building.3  These buildings are recognized not only for 
their aesthetic appeal but also as landmarks.  Does the diligent architect seek copyright or 
trademark protection? Is it possible to use both simultaneously? 
¶4 This article offers a commentary on the current state of intellectual property 
protection, specifically with regard to copyright and trademark law, of architectural 
designs and building structures.  Part II provides an overview and background of general 
copyright principles as well as copyright legislation designed to protect architectural 
works.  Part III provides an overview and background of general trademark and trade 
dress protection as well as a discussion of trademark policy under the Lanham Act.  Part 
IV of this note examines various circuit court opinions addressing infringement of 
architectural plans and building designs under both copyright and trademark laws.  
Finally, this note concludes with a recommendation of which intellectual property right 
affords its owner the greatest protection for architectural ingenuity. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
¶5 A copyright is not a trademark and a trademark is not a copyright.  Although both 
trademarks and copyrights concern intangible property rights and overlap in some 
aspects, there are also significant differences between copyrights and trademarks.4 
¶6 Copyright law has its roots in the U.S. Constitution.5  Copyrightable works include: 
literary, musical, and dramatic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works (including 
the non-utilitarian design features of useful articles); as well as compilations of works 
and derivative works.6  In essence, a copyright affords the owner of an original work of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium the right to control the display, publication, 
reproduction and creation of derivative works. 7 In addition, the protectible work must be 
an “original” and not copied from another source.8  Copyrights only protect particular 
expressions of ideas and not the ideas themselves.9 
¶7 In the early 1900s, Congress began to develop the parameters of federal copyright 
law while simultaneously seeking to develop a balance between the individual owner and 
the general public.10  The Copyright Act of 1909 (the “1909 Act”) was a comprehensive 
 
2 See U.S. Trademark No. 2,753,356 (issued Aug. 19, 2003); U.S. Trademark No. 1,962,821 (issued 
Mar. 19, 1996); U.S. Trademark No. 2,411,972 (issued Dec. 12, 2000). 
3 See U.S. Trademark No. 1,622,845 (issued Nov. 13, 1990); U.S. Trademark No. 1,746,564 (issued Jan. 
12, 1993); U.S. Trademark No. 2,037,110 (issued Feb. 11, 1997). 
4 For purposes of clarity, Part II will be devoted to the historical development and the present condition 
of U.S. copyright law.  Part III will address only trademark law using a similar format. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Patent and Copyright Clause) (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). 
6 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
7 Id. at § 106. 
8 Id. at § 103. 
9 Id. at § 102. 
10 See generally 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.05[D] (2005) 
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codification of federal copyright law.  For example, the 1909 Act provided a list of 
definitions of works that could be protected by copyright law, including: “drawings or 
plastic works of a scientific or technical nature.”11 
¶8 Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976 Act”) to keep pace with 
advancing technological and multimedia changes as well as to address deficiencies of 
copyright law under the 1909 Act.12  In the 1976 Act, architectural drawings and 
specifications were included for the first time under the definition of valid copyrightable 
subject matter.13  The 1976 Act, did not, however, include protection of three 
dimensional structures derived from technical drawings.14  Specifically, the 1976 Act did 
not prohibit a person from taking the measurements of a building and preparing sketches 
to replicate the building without obtaining consent from the original architect or design 
professional. 
A. The Birth of the Copyright 
¶9 A copyright is automatically created when the copyrightable work is memorialized 
in a tangible form, such as writing or sound recording, regardless of whether the work has 
been published or registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.15  Furthermore, a copyright 
notice is not required for an unpublished work.16  The copyright owner is not precluded 
from affixing a copyright notice on publicly distributed copies of the work.17 
¶10 To register the work, the author must deposit in the Copyright Office two complete 
copies of the work, an executed copyright application, and an application fee.18  A 
copyright registration is a prerequisite to suing an infringer.19  More importantly, the 
copyright owner can not recover statutory damages or attorney’s fees for copyright 
infringement unless the work is registered.20  A certificate of copyright is prima facie 
 
[hereinafter NIMMER].  
11 For an historical overview of the 1909 Copyright Act, see generally Emily Ayers, Comment, Case 
Closed: Federal Courts Resolve the Question of an Exclusive Licensee’s Ability to Sublicense a Copyright, 
24 LOY. LA. ENT. L. REV. 185, 188 (2004). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 101-1332 (Fixation in a tangible medium is a prerequisite to federal protection.  If the 
creation and fixation of the work occurred after January 1, 1978, the 1976 Act applies.). 
13 Id. at § 101 (Architectural drawings are protectible as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.  
Specifications are protectible as “literary works.”  The building structures built from these drawings are not 
copyrightable subject matter under the 1976 Act.).  
14 Id. at § 101-1332. 
15 Id. at § 201(a). 
16 Id. at § 405(a). 
17 Id. at § 401(a) (A valid copyright notices includes: 1) the symbol ©, or the word “copyright” or the 
abbreviation “corp.”; 2) the year of the first publication; and 3) the name of the owner of the copyright.  
After March 1, 1989, the use of a copyright notice is not longer mandatory.  The absence of a copyright 
notice may exonerate an alleged “innocent’ infringer liable for actual or statutory damages.  After March 1, 
1989, as a result of the United States adhering to the Berne Convention, the requirement of a copyright 
notice on a published work was eliminated.  Although there are numerous benefits to using a copyright 
notice, it is no longer essential for copyright protection.  The Berne Convention recognizes copyright 
protection across international boundaries.  The Berne Convention was signed in 1886 but was not adopted 
by the United States until 1989.)  Id. 
18 Id. at § 408. See also www.loc.gov (for instructions in registering a copyright) (last visited March 31, 
2005). 
19 Id. at § 412. 
20 Id. 
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evidence of validity.21  A person who uses the work without consent infringes the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights to control the work.22  Therefore, an alleged infringer 
bears the burden of proving that the work is not valid.23 
¶11 The lifespan of a copyright varies by the date when the work was first published.  
For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the term lasts the author’s lifetime plus 
seventy years after the author’s death.24  If the copyright is a “work for hire,”25 the term is 
ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever period is 
shorter.26 
¶12 The individual or joint authors of a work initially own the copyright.27  Each author 
is granted a “bundle of exclusive rights.”28  A copyright is divisible, so the recipient of 
any exclusive grant or license becomes the owner of the copyright of those rights.29  Any 
transfer of these exclusive rights must be in writing.30 
¶13 Prior to enactment of specific legislation directed to protecting architectural works, 
building structures were immune from copyright protection and thus could be duplicated 
as long as the original technical drawings were not reproduced.31  In fact, courts were 
reluctant to afford copyright protection to architects for building structures in the absence 
of a specific mandate by Congress. 32 
B. Copyright Protection of Architectural Works 
¶14 On December 1, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed into law the 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”).33  The AWCPA resolved an 
important dispute in U.S. intellectual property law, extending copyright protection to 
architectural designs embodied in three dimensional building structures.34 
¶15 The AWCPA expanded the definition of copyrightable subject matter to include 
architectural works.35  An “architectural work” is defined as “the design of a building as 
embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, 
or drawings.  The work includes the overall form, as well as the arrangement and 
composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual 
 
21 Id. at § 410(c). 
22 Id. at § 501(a). 
23 See CSM Investors, Inc. v. Everest Dev., Ltd., 840 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (D. Minn. 1994). 
24 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
25 Id. at §101 (If an employer or third-party commissions a work, the copyright is automatically 
considered the “author” for purposes of copyright law.  A work for hire is created if either 1) the work was 
prepared by an employee within the scope of employment or 2) the work was commissioned expressly 
agreed in a written document signed by both parties.). 
26 Id. at § 302(c). 
27 Id. at § 201(a). 
28 Id. at § 106 (The bundle of exclusive rights includes: the right to copy; the right to make derivative 
works, and the right to sell, distribute, and display the works.). 
29 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
30 Id. at § 204. 
31 DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962). 
32 Id. 
33 The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 701-706, 104 Stat. 
5133 (1990) (codified at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AWCPA]. 
34 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
35 Id.  
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standard features.”36  Under the AWCPA, “buildings” are “structures that are habitable 
and intended to be both permanent and stationary, such as residential houses and office 
buildings, and other permanent and stationary structures which are used but not inhabited 
by human beings, such as churches, gazebos, museums, and garden pavilions.”37  
Consequently, the AWCPA distinguishes between “the design of buildings” and 
“building structures” as physical objects consistent with the fundamental principles of 
copyright law.38 
¶16 The AWCPA further acknowledges an appreciation of ideas and the expression of 
those ideas.39  Architectural works are inherently a compilation of ideas and expressions 
which contradicts the purpose of copyright law’s exclusion of “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”40 
¶17 A copyright automatically springs to life when the architectural drawings and 
specifications are created.41  An alleged infringer is prohibited from not only copying the 
architectural plans but also re-creating the building design even if the original 
architectural plans are not used.42  Standard design details, “such as windows, doors, and 
other staple building components, as well as functional elements whose design or 
placement is dictated by utilitarian concerns” do not qualify for copyright protection 
because there is no independent originality.43 
¶18 The Patent and Copyright Clause’s articulated objective of “promoting the progress 
of science and the useful arts” may appear to be inconsistent with copyright laws directed 
to architectural works which essentially allow an architect to control the copying of a 
building structure existing in the public domain.44  Furthermore, controlling the copying 
or unauthorized distribution of architectural plans or other technical drawings presents a 
unique issue between the architect and the client who commissioned the work because 
there is an inherent conflict regarding ownership of the work.  A client who has paid for 
design services feels entitled to distribute or use the drawings, but if the client has not 
received permission or license from the architect, the client will be unable to proceed 
using those particular copyrighted works.45 
¶19 Under the AWCPA, a design professional has a remedy for the construction of a 
copycat building and also for other unauthorized uses of the protected design.46  Although 
 
36 Id. at 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(8). 
37 37 C.F.R. §202.11 (b)(2) (2000). 
38 See generally AWCPA, supra note 33. 
39 See generally id.  
40 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
41 See generally id. at § 102. 
42 Id. at § 501(a).  Additionally, the owners of a building, embodying an architectural work, however, 
may without the consent of the author of the copyright owner of the architectural work make or authorize 
alterations or destruction of the building.  Id. at § 120(b). 
43 United States Copyright Office, Copyright Claims in Architectural Works (August 2003), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ41.html (last visited April 7, 2005). 
44 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
45 For further discussion, see generally Thomas M. Brownell, Architectural Plans Can Be Protected by 
Copyright, available at http:/www.viennapat.com/newsletter/vol2iss7/architect.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2005). 
46 For example, in agreeing to provide architectural services, including the preparation of construction 
drawings for a client, a design professional can contract to transfer to the client the right to construct the 
building (i.e. the derivative work).  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).  
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it may not have been originally intended, the AWCPA was perfectly timed to address the 
unauthorized use of the architectural designs in light of the technological advances of 
digital media.  Additionally, with regard to electronic copies, the AWCPA provides the 
design professional a remedy in situations where a digital image of the building has been 
taken and drawings are prepared using the digital image.47 
¶20 The act of copying architectural drawings or the building design can occur with 
unprecedented speed and accuracy.48  The American Institute of Architects (“AIA”) 
warns design professionals of the urgency in diligently protecting the ownership, use, and 
transfer of design drawings.49  A client or other third party who attempts to construct a 
building using unauthorized architectural plans and construction drawings engages in 
infringement for which the design professional may obtain an injunction.50  This remedy 
did not exist under the 1976 Act because architectural works were not considered 
copyrightable subject matter. 
¶21 Without the protections of the AWCPA, an architect would not have any remedies 
if his of her building design was created using a digital photo.  Although, the AWCPA 
specifically carves out an exception to copyright infringement by the mere photographing 
of the work, it does not grant an individual unlimited ability to use the image to create a 
copycat building without the copyright owner’s (i.e. the architect or the owner) 
permission.  The 1976 Act recognized three-dimensional sculptures, but not three 
dimensional building structures, as copyrightable subject matter.  Was the distinction that 
the 1976 Act valued artistic works as being more valuable than architectural works?  
Would it not be as offensive to allow a competitor to duplicate an architectural work 
simply because it also has a functional purpose?  Regardless of the reason, the 1976 
Copyright Act only afforded an architect or design professional the right to protect 
against the direct copying of the architectural plans.51  Common sense would dictate that 
by the time the architect discovered that his or her plans had been copied, the copycat 
building structure would have already been erected.  Architects and other design 
professionals invest significant time, energy, and financing in preparing design drawings 
and “it would be a grave injustice to permit a competitor to profit from another 
competitors’ hard work and injure that competitor simultaneously.”52 
¶22 The inclusion of “architectural works” under the AWCPA addresses the 
inadequacies and unintended consequences of the application of traditional copyright law 
principles to architectural plans.53  Although, there was some debate for several decades 
regarding whether an architect should be entitled to copyright protection of the building 
 
47 For example, with the advancement of digital media, a third party can take a digital picture and 
reproduce architectural drawings using images of different perspectives of the building structure.  Without 
the benefits of copyright law, an architect would be vulnerable to unauthorized distribution or alterations to 
his or her architectural drawings or building structures.   
48 See David A. Roberts, There Goes My Baby: Buildings as Intellectual Property Under the 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, at 23 (Spring 2001).  Mr. 
Roberts identifies examples of some of the recent changes in intellectual property law and the impact on 
construction practice. 
49 http://www.aia.org/print_template.cfm?pagename=pm_a_transferdocs (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
50 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
51 See generally ACWPA, supra note 33. 
52  See Value Group, Inc. v. Mendam Lake Estates, L.P., 800 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (D.N.J. 1992). 
53 See AWCPA, supra note 33. 
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itself, this problem was not remedied until the AWCPA was enacted.54  The exclusion of 
“architectural works” under the 1976 Act was definitely a fatal flaw and inconsistent with 
international law.55 
¶23 Prior to the passage of the AWCPA, courts refused to enjoin the construction of a 
building made from infringing copyrighted plans.56  Courts were unwilling to extend 
copyright law to grant architects copyright protection for the building designs constructed 
from these drawings. 57  In fact, there was some debate regarding whether the Copyright 
Act would ever be amended to address the exclusion of the building structure erected 
from the infringing plans.58 
¶24 However, with the enactment of the AWCPA, an injunction prohibiting the 
continued construction of a building derived from infringing architectural plans became a 
viable remedy.59  Now, architects have an immediate remedy for infringement of the 
building structures erected from their architectural and construction drawings.60 A 
preliminary or permanent injunction is a powerful remedy because it requires the alleged 
offender to cease all infringing activity immediately.61  In determining whether an 
injunction is an appropriate remedy, courts are required to examine the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim, especially in light of the fact that a preliminary injunction is an 
extraordinary remedy.62 
¶25 Shortly after the AWCPA became law, this principle of enjoining construction of a 
copyrighted architectural work was tested in Value Group, Inc. v. Mendham Lake 
Estates.63  In this case, the district court granted the plaintiffs, a real estate development 
company and its architect, a preliminary injunction against the defendant, the plaintiff’s 
sole competitor in the geographic area, from using and constructing a housing design 
created by the plaintiff-architect64 after the defendant filed for a building permit using 
 
54 See DeSilva, 213 F. Supp. at 195-196 
55 See AWCPA, supra note 33. 
56 See generally DeSilva, 213 F. Supp. at 184.  Plaintiff, a construction company, filed a copyright 
infringement suit his architectural plan.  Id. at 187.  In this case, the issue was whether architectural plans 
filed in a public office, as required by local ordinance, is tantamount to publication of said drawings 
thereby terminating the author’s common law copyright in said plans.  Id. at 194.  The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff’s copyright interest was terminated when the plans were submitted as part of the building 
permit application.  Id.  The court disagreed but was unwilling to allow the plaintiff’s claim in light of an 
established legal principle that the building of a structure from a copyrighted architectural plan is not 
infringement of the architectural plans.  Id. at 196.  
57 Id. at 198.  
58 Id. at 196. 
59 17 U.S.C. § 502.   
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Four 
factors govern whether a district court should enter a preliminary injunction: (1) the plaintiff's likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) the possibility of irreparable harm to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction; 
(3) public interest considerations; and (4) potential harm to third parties.”).  Id. at 532; see also In re 
Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001); Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 122 
(2d Cir. 1994); Nitro Leisure Products, LLC v. Acushnet Co, 341 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (To 
succeed on the merits of a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used the 
mark in commerce without its consent and “that the unauthorized use was likely to deceive, cause 
confusion, or result in mistake.”).  Id. at 1359; 17 U.S.C. §§ 120 and 502(a). 
63 800 F. Supp. at 1228. 
64 Id. at 1230-31. 
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architectural plans that were identical to the plaintiff’s.65  In determining whether to grant 
equitable relief, the court engaged in a four-part balancing test and concluded that all of 
the factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff.66  The court concluded that the architectural 
plans were “substantially similar” and that the plaintiff demonstrated a high probability of 
success with respect to its copyright claim.67  The passage of the AWCPA and the result 
in Value Group signified a new era in intellectual property protection of architectural 
works. 
¶26 To prevail on a copyright infringement claim of an architectural work, a copyright 
owner must prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying or infringement of 
protected portions of its copyrighted work.68  Additionally, to receive copyright 
protection of architectural plans and specifications, the plaintiff must also comply with 
the requirements of “originality,” despite the fact that the fundamental elements of 
architectural designs exist in the public domain.69  As stated above, an “architectural 
work” is a design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, 
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.70  Furthermore, the work includes 
“the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in 
the design but does not include individual standard features.”71 
¶27 In determining whether copyright infringement has occurred, the district court will 
engage in a two-part test.72  First, the court must evaluate the validity of the copyright at 
issue.73  A certificate of copyright registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a 
copyright.74  But, even if a valid copyright certificate exists, architectural works must also 
exhibit some creativity before they are eligible for protection.75  However, the threshold 
of originality is not a high standard.76 
¶28 The second part of the copyright infringement analysis is evaluated under a 
“substantial similarity” analysis comparing the two works at issue and establishing that 
the alleged infringer had access to the plaintiff’s work.77  Copyright infringement can be 
 
65 Id. at 1230. 
66 Id. at 1231 (citations omitted) (stating that “The standard for preliminary injunction requires a court to 
balance the following four factors: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits after a full hearing; (2) 
whether the movant will be irreparably injured without the restraint; (3) whether the party to be enjoined 
will be irreparably injured if the preliminary relief is granted; and (4) whether the public interest will be 
served by the preliminary relief.”). 
67 Id. at 1234. 
68 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348, 361 (1991).  
69 The “originality” requirements are independent creation and minimal degree of creativity. NIMMER, 
supra note 10, at § 2.01. 
70 See CSM Investors, Inc., 840 F. Supp. at 1309 (citations omitted). 
71 A real estate developer and architectural firm filed a motion for summary judgment alleging copyright 
infringement of the architectural plans and building design.  The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion 
and held that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s plans were substantially similar and that the defendant 
infringed the copyrighted work.  Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See Gemel Precision Tool, Co. Inc. v. Pharma Tool Corp., 1995 WL 71243 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  The 
"level of originality and creativity that must be shown is minimal, only an unmistakable dash of originality 
need be demonstrated, high standards of uniqueness in creativity are dispensed with."  Folio Impressions 
Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759,764-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
76 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1991).  
77 See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01; see also 
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established using direct or circumstantial evidence.78  Evidence of direct copying is often 
not available, therefore, in most cases infringement must be established using 
circumstantial evidence by showing that: 1) the accused infringer had access to the 
plaintiff’s plans and specifications; and 2) the two works are substantially similar in idea 
and expression.79  A substantially similar analysis involves focusing on the extrinsic 
similarity of ideas, specifically the objective similarity of the details in the works.80  
Consequently, if there exists a similarity of ideas, then a “similarity of expression is 
evaluated using an intrinsic test depending on the response of the ordinary, reasonable 
person to the forms of expression.”81  The presence of substantial similarities, and not the 
differences between the works, determines whether infringement has occurred.  
Circumstantial evidence is usually introduced to show that the defendant had “access” 
and the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work was unauthorized.82  A unique feature of 
the infringement analysis with respect to architectural works is that there are inherent 
features included in all buildings that must be copied for practical purposes.  In some 
ways, this is both an advantage and disadvantage, because the architect has to be able to 
articulate which design features are ornamental and original as well as protectible without 
minimizing the overall look and feel of the building structure. 
¶29 Nevertheless, an architect may not be convinced that a federally registered 
copyright of his or her architectural plan would be a prudent investment.  There are at 
least two reasons why architects should seek copyright protection for their work: 1) to 
resolve ownership conflicts and 2) to preclude takings by clients who have not paid for 
the finished product.83  The AWCPA, however, did not resolve all issues involving the 
scope of protection afforded to “architectural works.”  Since its enactment in 1990, the 
scope of AWCPA has been tested with respect to whether the act applies to architectural 
works that were substantially constructed as of the December 1, 1990,84 whether a 
sculpted work attached to a building exterior was copyrightable subject matter,85 whether 
 
CSM Investors, 840 F. Supp. at 1309. 
78 CSM Investors, 840 F. Supp. at 1311.  
79 Id.  




83 See Thomas M. Brownell, supra note 45; see also Mary Cullen Yeager & Katherine Golden, Owner v. 
Architect: Who Owns the Design?, at http://www.faegre.com/articles/article_print.aspx?id=508 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2005); Werner Sabo and James K. Zahn, Copyright Act - Effect on Construction Practice, at 
http://www.sabozahn.com/articles.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).  
84 See Richard J. Zitz, Inc. v Dos Santos Pereira, 232 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2000).  Plaintiff, a residential 
building contractor, with one employee, Richard Zitz sued builders of an allegedly infringing structure.  
Mr. Zitz prepared a floor plan and drawings for the windows, ceiling, and roof of the structure.  Mr. Zitz 
obtained a building permit and commenced construction in 1990.  Subsequently, Mr. Zitz filed four 
copyright applications for the architectural drawings he prepared and two of the architectural works 
constructed as well as the unconstructed architectural works.  The district court concluded that plaintiff’s 
copyright applications were invalid.  Specifically, the court stated that plaintiff’s works were excluded from 
copyright protection under the AWCPA because the works were constructed prior to enactment date of the 
legislation.  Id. at 292 (citations omitted).  
85  See Leicester v. Warner Bros. Corp., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).  Plaintiff, an artist who designed 
a streetwall and courtyard space registered as a “sculptural work” as a copyright, filed a copyright 
infringement action against a movie studio alleging depiction of a portion of design in movie entitled 
“Batman Forever.” Id. at 1212-14.  The court acknowledged that the “streetwall” included artistic elements 
but declined to characterize the “streetwall” as a sculpted work for purposes of the AWCPA.  A portion of 
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engineering drawings are protected under the AWCPA,86 and whether the AWCPA 
applies in various ownership issues of architectural drawings.87 
¶30 Most recently, in William Hablinski Architecture v. Amir Construction,88 one of the 
dispositive issues related to the scope of the “substantially similar” analysis used to 
evaluate the validity of copyrighted design.  Recognizing the uniqueness of the 
architectural profession in duplicating design elements for not only aesthetic reasons but 
also for purely functional ones as well, it is important that courts be able to distinguish 
between insubstantial modifications and protectible design elements for purposes of 
analyzing whether copyright infringement has occurred.89  Further, it is undisputed that 
the architect retains ownership and control of his or her designs until such time as an 
appropriate transfer to a third-party takes place by license or express grant.90  Therefore, 
the issue of “substantially similar” should be evaluated with the principles described 
above in mind. 
 
the structure included functional lights and other symbolic and aesthetic elements, extracted from the 
building façade.  The court concluded that the streetwall and associated towers were not separate elements 
that qualified as copyrightable subject matter.  Consequently, the movie studio’s pictorial representation 
was not infringement because pictorial representations of buildings are expressly excluded by AWCPA.  Id. 
at 1213. 
86 See Guillot-Vogt Associates, Inc. v. Holly & Smith, 848 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. La. 1994). Plaintiff, a 
subcontractor, prepared engineering design drawings for the mechanical and electrical portions of a state 
project.  During the course of the Project, the architect became sick and was unable to continue the Project.  
In response the State hired the defendant to replace the plaintiff.  Subsequently, the defendant contacted the 
plaintiff to complete the drawings but the plaintiff declined due to the fact that he had not paid for the 
previous work.  Consequently, the State instructed the defendant to remove the logo and stamps bearing the 
plaintiff’s name and replace it with the defendant’s name and title block.  During the interim, the plaintiff 
filed for a copyright registration.  The State argued that “engineering drawings” fell outside of the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter.  The court disagreed holding that copyright protection for engineering 
drawings fell within the scope of the AWCPA and that engineering drawings had enjoyed a long-standing 
relationship of copyright protection.  In fact, the court interpreted the AWCPA to provide a previously 
lacking copyright protection to physical architectural works.  Id. at 686.  The court further included a list of 
citations supporting the proposition that architectural, engineering and technical drawings are all valid 
copyrightable subject matter.  Id. at 687. 
87 See Curtis v. Benson, Jr., 959 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. La. 1997). Plaintiff, an architect, filed a copyright 
infringement and unfair competition action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act against other architects and 
owners of the New Orleans Saints football stadium—the Superdome.  Id.  The defendants unsuccessfully 
argued that the plaintiff had lost his copyright rights when the technical drawings he prepared in 1967 were 
published without a copyright notice and transferred to Tulane University.  Id. at 350.  The plaintiff 
countered that no publication occurred with his permission and the court agreed but declined to grant 
summary judgment on the issue.  Id. at 353.  The court concluded that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because the issue of whether the defendants were liable for contributing or aiding in the 
copying and false designation of the plaintiff’s plans was an issue for trier of fact.  Id. at 352.   
88 See No. CV03-6365 CAS (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 2003).  
89 See Adam T. Mow, Building With Style: Testing the Boundaries of the Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act, UTAH L. REV. 853, 862 (2004).  The author presents a very interesting argument 
regarding the copyright infringement of an aesthetic design.  The author proposes that “architecture is a 
profession that has largely accepted an architect’s general borrowing or imitation of another’s ideas.”  Id. at 
868.  Consequently, this borrowing principle exists because “architecture is evolving and fluid field, where 
architects never stop learning from, observing, and innovating upon the works of their mentors.  Id. at 870.  
Finally, the author proposes that “exposure to contemporary works of others is bound to leave an 
impression.”  Id.  The author distinguishes between stylistic elements such as structural and aesthetic 
elements and historical styles such as elements or materials used in Greek temples.  Id. at 874.  The author 
concludes that stylistic elements and historical systems should be excluded when courts engage in 
substantially similar analysis under the AWCPA.  Id. at 876.   
90 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK LAW 
¶31 A trademark affords its owner the right to use a specific mark to identify the source 
of the goods.91  Trademark law, unlike copyright law, is not derived from the Patent and 
Copyright Clause but rather has its roots in the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.92  A trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any 
combination thereof” used by a person “to identify and distinguish his or her goods, 
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”93 
¶32 A party does not need to register the mark prior to use in commerce.94  
Additionally, the mark does not automatically become a trademark upon creation; instead 
the user must use the mark on or in connection with goods, or by displaying the mark in 
the sale or advertising of services.95  The mark owner, however, automatically acquires 
trademark rights in the geographic area of use or the mark owner can federally register 
the mark to preclude an alleged infringer from using the mark nationwide.96 
¶33 To obtain a trademark, the owner must file an application establishing one of the 
following: 1) actual use of the mark in commerce; 2) a bona fide intention to use the 
mark in commerce (i.e. an intent to use); or 3) a foreign owner’s country of origin 
application filed with a statement of a bona fide intent to use the mark in U.S. 
commerce.97  The applicant is required to file a specimen showing the mark in commerce 
at the time the application is filed or before registration.98  The mark can be opposed by 
anyone alleging that the registration should not be granted because the mark is likely to 
cause confusion or is likely to dilute the distinctiveness of a famous mark.99 
¶34 Once federal registration is obtained, the owner can use a statutory trademark 
notice to reasonably notify the public of the ownership. 100  Trademark protection extends 
indefinitely as long as the mark is not abandoned and does not become a generic term.101  
The owner must maintain federal registration by (1) filing a declaration during the sixth 
and tenth year after issuance stating that the mark has been in use in commerce and (2) 
renewing the registration every ten years.102  The first entity to use a mark is considered 
 
91 Trademarks include brand names, trade dress, service marks, certifications marks and collective 
marks.  The legal principles apply to all of the above reference terms and are commonly referred as 
“marks.”  For purposes of this paper, the discussion of trademark has been simple. 
92 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl  3.  (“The Commerce Clause”) 
93 The Trademark Act of 1996 is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 et seq. (2004).  The short cite reference of 
this act is the Lanham Act.  The Lanham Act is a marriage of state law and registration provisions that 
would provide a mark owner with protection in each of the fifty states and territories.  The owner of the 
mark is not restricted to federal registration and is permitted to use both federal and state law to protect the 
mark.   
94 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 




99 Id. at § 1063. 
100 Id. at § 1111.  Trademark notice can be used in the following forms: 1) the symbol ®; 2) the phrase 
“Registered U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,” or 3) or the abbreviation “Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off.”   
101 Id. at § 1058. 
102 Id. at §§ 1058 and 1059.  Non-use of a mark for three continuously years is sufficient to prove an 
intent to abandon the mark and permit another party to obtain exclusive use of the mark. 
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the owner of the trademark regardless of whether another party obtains federal 
registration. 
¶35 To determine whether a mark should be afforded trademark protection, the court 
must evaluate the mark in terms of the trademark classification: 1) generic; 2) descriptive 
3) suggestive; 4) arbitrary; or 5) fanciful.103  Trademark protection has a sliding scale of 
protection.104  On one end of the spectrum is generic marks which do not qualify for 
trademark protection, and at the other end of the spectrum is fanciful marks which enjoy 
the greatest trademark protection because they are “inherently distinctive.”105 
¶36 Infringement of the trademark occurs when someone else uses the same or a 
confusingly similar term, on the same or closely related goods or services, in the same 
geographic areas of the registered or unregistered mark.106  In the event of trademark 
infringement, the owner is afforded certain civil remedies and statutory damages.107 
¶37 It is well settled that a trademark protects more than just words and does so even 
when there is no likelihood of confusion.108  Current trademark protection includes: 
words, numbers, slogans, pictures, symbols, characters, sounds, graphic designs, and 
color.109  The expansive definition of trademarks affords a merchant or the mark owner 
the ability to distinguish its goods from its competitors’ goods..  The exclusivity of 
trademark law is founded on the principle of appropriation.110 
¶38 Trademark law is a subset of the broader common law of unfair competition.111  
Consequently, trademark protection is assigned to the first user of the mark in commerce 
and not the first person to adopt the mark.  112 
A. Trade Dress Protection 
¶39 As the principles of trademark policy have evolved, courts have recognized that the 
“trade dress” of a product is also protectible.113  Trade dress protection extends beyond 
 
103 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
107 See id.  Civil Remedies include: 1) an injunction against future infringement; 2) disgorgement of the 
defendant’s profits; 3) treble damages for past infringement suffered by the owner of the mark; 3) 
destruction of all materials bearing the infringe mark an recall of infringing goods; and 4) reasonable 
attorney fees.  The alleged infringer must have notice before a trademark owner can receive monetary 
damages. 
108  Id. 
109 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § § 9, 13 (1995). [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. 
110 Id.  See also JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.02(1)(b) (1999). The 
distinction is an important factor in determining whether a party is entitled to trademark protection of a 
mark that has been used in commerce.  For purposes of this article, an extensive discussion of the history of 
trademark law has been excluded but the reader can refer to the following documents for a comprehensive 
overview of trademark law:  Andrew T. Spence, When A Landmark Cannot Serve as a Trademark: 
Trademark Protection for Building Designs in Light of Rock And Roll Hall of Fame And Museum, Inc. v. 
Gentile Productions, 2 WASH. U.J.L & POL’Y 517 (2000); Lee B. Burgunder, Commercial Photographs of 
Famous Buildings: The Sixth Circuit Fails to Make the Hall of Fame, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 791 (1999). 
111 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, §9. 
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
113 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) affirming Taco Cabana International, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 
932 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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just the packaging of the product (i.e. the label, box, display or similar packaging 
elements) to include the product’s total image (i.e. the size, shape, color, textures, or 
graphics).114  Consequently, extending trade dress protection to a three-dimensional 
object is consistent with the spirit and intent of trademark protection regardless of 
whether the design is viewed as packaging or the product itself.115 
¶40 The expansion of trademark law to cover trade dress and product configurations did 
not develop without significant growing pains.  In fact, an owner seeking trademark 
protection of a product feature should anticipate that courts will use heightened scrutiny 
in determining the validity of the mark to ensure that the mark does not run afoul of the 
true intent of trademark protection by stifling competition.116 
¶41 In response, courts have developed the “functionality” test to determine whether a 
product design is more “useful” or “aesthetic.”117  Even if a mark has a function or 
purpose, the mark is not precluded from being a valid mark, especially if other aspects of 
the mark are non-functional.118  Consequently, the same underlying principles that 
provide for trademark protection of aesthetically functional marks generally apply to 
using trademark laws to protect architectural features such as building designs.119 
¶42 Trade dress protection is also subject to the general principles of trademark law 
distinguishing between a generic and a fanciful mark.  Trade dress is generic if “well 
known,” or “common,” “a mere refinement of a commonly adopted and well known form 
of ornamentation,” or a “common basic shape of design,” even if it has “not before been 
refined in precisely the same way.”120  Imploring this same logic, at the other end of the 
spectrum, trade dress is “inherently distinctive” if it inherently identifies a specific source 
or owner of the product.121  Even if the trade dress is not inherently distinctive, it may 
still be protected if it has acquired secondary meaning.122 
¶43 In determining whether trade dress protection is warranted, a court must first decide 
whether the trade dress of the architectural work is a product design or a product package.  
The Supreme Court has not addressed how trade dress protection would apply to 
architectural works.  Thus, one could make an argument that the design features of the 
 
114 John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 960, 980 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Duraco 
Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3rd Cir. 1994); Burgunder, supra note 
110, at 796.   
115 An example of a widely recognized three-dimensional shape that has been afforded trade-dress 
protection is the Coca-Cola bottle.  See Coca-Cola, Co. v. Alma-Leo, U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989).  Specifically, a Coca-Cola bottle enjoys multiple intellectual property protection including trade-
secret (e.g. the Coca-Cola formula in the bottle), trademark (e.g. the Coca-Cola name), and trade-dress 
protection (e.g. the bottle itself). 
116 Burgunder, supra note 110, at 797. 
117 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169-70. 
118 Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobile Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).  The 
plaintiff designed and manufactured upscale sports cars.  The defendant manufactured another vehicle that 
replicated the external shape of the plaintiff’s car designs for a significantly reduced price.  Id. at 1238.  
The court held, consistent with long standing trademark law principles, that aesthetic functionality does 
preclude a finding of non-functionality for trademark purposes where the design suggests the origin of the 
product.  Id. at 1247.  
119 GILSON, supra note 112, § 7.02(7)(h)(i); see also Spence, supra note 110, at 527-28. 
120 Ale House Management, Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 142 (4th Cir. 2000). 
121 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. 
122 Id. at 769 (“Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides that a descriptive mark that could not be registered 
under that Act may be registered if it ‘has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.’ This 
acquired distinctiveness is generally called ‘secondary meaning.’”) (citations omitted). 
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architectural work are the product design.  In the alternative, one could argue that the 
overall structure of the architectural work is the product packaging.  The important 
distinction is that trade dress protection of a product design does not require any 
secondary meaning because it is inherently distinctive.  In contrast, trade dress protection 
of a product’s packaging is not inherently distinctive and thus requires acquired 
secondary meaning to be protectible.123  Therefore, the availability of trade dress 
protection is dependent on the characterization of the elements to be protected. 
B. Trademark Protection of Architectural Works 
¶44 As stated above, trademark law protects more than just words.  If the applicant 
satisfies the requirements provided under the Lanham Act, then the first user of the mark 
is entitled to register the mark with the United States Patent & Trademark Office 
(“PTO”). 124  In the PTO’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, “the three-
dimensional configuration of a building is able to be registered only if it is used in such a 
way that it is or could be perceived as a mark.”125 Additionally, the Lanham Act provides 
that a person is liable for infringement if he or she, “without consent of the registrant” 
uses the mark “in commerce, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of 
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising.”126 
¶45 To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement of an architectural trademark, the 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant used 1) a “reproduction, counterfeit, copy or 
colorable imitation” of the plaintiff’s mark; 2) without consent; 3) in interstate 
commerce; 4) in connection with a sale or offer for sale; and 5) “where such use is likely 
to cause confusion.”127 Consequently, it is well established that “a plaintiff must show 
that it has actually used the designation at issue as a trademark, and that the defendant 
has also used the same or a similar designation as a trademark.” 128  For a valid 
trademark, the designation must create “a separate and distinct commercial impression, 
which . . . performs the trademark function of identifying the source of the merchandise 
to the customers.”129  The plaintiff must also establish likelihood that the defendant’s 
designation will be confused with the plaintiff’s trademark, such that consumers are 
mistakenly led to believe that the defendant’s goods are produced or sponsored by the 
plaintiff.130  In other words, infringement of an architectural trademark requires the 
existence of a likelihood of confusion which courts evaluate on a case-by-case basis. 
 
123 See id. at 768 (holding that trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectible without a showing 
that it has acquired secondary meaning); cf. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 
(2000) (holding that product design is entitled to protection as unregistered trade dress only if it has 
acquired secondary meaning).   
124 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
125 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 
1301.02 (c), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
126 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
127 Annette Lesieutre Honan, The Skyscraping Reach of the Lanham Act: How Far Should the Protection 
of Famous Building Design Trademarks Be Extended?, 94 NW. U.L.REV. 1509, 1513-14 (2000).  
128 See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prod., 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir.1996)). 
129 Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, 134 F.3d at 752.  
130 Id. at 753-54.  (The Sixth Circuit was unconvinced that the building design for the Rock and Roll 
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¶46 An owner of a famous building who owns a federally registered trademark can 
assert a claim of infringement under § 1114 of the Lanham Act.131 In the absence of 
federal registration, the owner may assert a claim of false designation of origin under § 
1125(a) of the Lanham Act.132  Unlike copyright law, federal registration is not a 
prerequisite to seeking a remedy for trademark infringement.133  In fact, many architects 
successfully prevail on trademark infringement claims under § 1125(a). 
IV. CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS 
¶47 In the absence of a Supreme Court or Federal Circuit case on point, the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have recently addressed both copyright and trademark protection of 
famous and not so famous building designs.  Even though the term “architectural works” 
was recently defined as copyrightable subject matter, architectural works have enjoyed 
long-standing intellectual property protection, specifically as registered trademarks. 134As 
discussed above, copyrights and trademarks provide different but overlapping scopes of 
protection, the key distinction being when the requisite intellectual property attaches.  For 
copyrights it is when the work is created, and for trademarks it is when the mark has been 
published in the public domain.135 
¶48 The Sixth Circuit has provided some guidance in analyzing the scope of intellectual 
property protection of building designs.  First, in Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and 
Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Products,136 the court concluded that the plaintiff did not possess 
a valid trademark registration and thus could not prevail for trademark infringement 
against the defendant.137  At the other end of the spectrum, in Johnson v. Jones,138 the 
court was more sympathetic in granting relief to the architect for the copying of the 
architect’s drawings. 
¶49 The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame case sparked significant legal discussion regarding 
the accuracy of the court’s opinion and the affect of the court’s decision in this area of the 
law. 139  The long-standing principles of copyright protection of architectural drawings 
coupled with the AWCPA amendment incorporating architectural works should have 
 
Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. could serve as a valid trademark because the plaintiff had not used the 
design consistently and continuously in the sale of goods.). 
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.  
132 Federal registration does not preclude an owner of a famous building from filing a claim under § 
1125(a) of the Lanham Act.  See generally id. § 1125(a).  
133 See id. 
134 See 17 U.S.C. §101. 
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051; 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
136 134 F.3d. 749 (6th Cir. 1998). 
137  Even if the owner had asserted a copyright infringement claim, the claim would most likely have 
been rejected because photographs taken of architectural works are not considered infringement of the 
owner’s copyright in the architectural work.  See 17 U.S.C. § 120. 
138 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998).  Even though, the facts presented a classic case of willful copyright 
infringement, the plaintiff was unable to recover statutory damages and attorney fees under the Copyright 
Act because the alleged infringement occurred prior to the registration of the plaintiff’s architectural plans.  
Id. at 504-505.  Due to the egregiousness of the parties’ behavior, the Court granted summary judgment on 
Plaintiff’s unfair competition claims under § 1125 (a) of the Lanham Act.  Id. at 496.   
139 Subsequent to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in this case, several law review articles criticize the 
conflicting positions of the majority and the design with respect to the use of trademark law to protect 
building designs.  See Spence, supra note 110, at 517. 
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precluded the Sixth Circuit from simply ignoring the museum’s rights to control 
derivative works of the building design.  Under the AWCPA, pictorial representations of 
building structures are specifically excluded.140  Furthermore, under the Lanham Act, 
trademark protection of photographs or other depictions of an architectural work is 
unavailable unless the architectural work has enjoyed inherent distinctiveness.141  Using a 
copyright substantial similarity analysis under these circumstances probably would not 
have yielded a different result.  Hence, this is an area where trademark and copyright law 
are consistent in their treatment of architectural works. 
¶50 In Johnson, the Sixth Circuit was presented with a slightly different issue regarding 
the protection of the plaintiff’s architectural plans.142  Rather than giving relief for 
copyright infringement, the court used a likelihood of confusion analysis under the 
Lanham Act, even though the dispute between the parties involved the unauthorized 
copying and use of the plaintiff’s architectural plans. 143  Fortunately for the plaintiff in 
this case, he asserted both a copyright infringement claim as well as an unfair 
competition claim under the Lanham Act, and he was granted at least one form of 
relief.144  This is a good strategy but one that is not always successful as evidenced in the 
following case decided by the Second Circuit. 
¶51 In affirming the district court’s decision, the Second Circuit’s decision in Attia v. 
Society of the New York Hospital145 concluded that the plaintiff’s drawings were not 
infringed under either trademark or copyright laws.  The Attia case presented an 
interesting set of facts involving an individual architect and joint venture of two well 
known architecture firms with respect to the scope of intellectual property protection of 
preliminary architectural.  The plaintiff, Eli Attia, was retained by the New York Hospital 
(“NYH”) to develop a design concept for a new building to be constructed over the 
F.D.R.146  Attia prepared a series of architectural drawings and sketches that NYH 
regarded as its “preferred” approach.147  Subsequently, Attia was engaged to work as a 
co-consultant with one of the defendants, Taylor Clark Architects, but unfortunately, the 
relationship between the parties soured.148  Eventually, NYH initiated a competition to 
 
140 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). Congress explicitly declined to grant authors of architectural works the right “to 
prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial 
representations.” Id. 
141 See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, 134 F.3d  at 753. 
142 Johnson, 149 F.3d 494.  Johnson, a licensed architect, was retained to build the defendant, Theresa 
Jones’ dream house.  Id. at 497.  The parties could not agree on the terms of a contract but Johnson 
continued to work on the project.  Id. at 498.  Johnson prepared demolition drawings, addition drawings 
and a site plan, which were all submitted to the local building department for approval.  Id.   Eventually, the 
parties were unable to agree on a contract and Johnson was terminated.  Id. at 499.  Jones retained another 
architect, who used Johnson’s drawings to create new drawing to submit to the building department, 
literally tracing Johnson’s designs and removing Johnson’s name and seal and replacing it with his name.  
Id.   Johnson, after a site visit, discovered that his drawings had been duplicated without his permission and 
that his name and seal had been removed.  Consequently, Johnson filed suit under 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5) 
and 8 of the Copyright Act and § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act.  Id. 
143 Johnson, 184 F.3d at 502-503; see generally Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 906 
F. Supp. 997, 1007-1008 (D.S.C. 1996); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Perni Constr. Inc., F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 
1990); Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 209 (D. Md. 1988). 
144 Johnson, 149 F.3d. at 494. 
145 201 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999).  
146 Id. at 52. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
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select a design team to prepare the final architectural plans and elected to use an alternate 
firm, which included the architectural firm initially retained to work with Attia.149 
¶52 Neither the Second Circuit nor the District Court believed that there was a genuine 
issue of fact regarding whether the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s drawings were 
substantially similar.150  The Second Circuit noted that “not all copying from copyrighted 
material is necessarily an infringement of copyright.”151  There are elements of a 
copyrighted work that are not protected even against intentional copying.152  Ultimately, 
the court concluded that Attia’s drawings were “preliminary and conceptual,” and 
therefore, just mere ideas.153  Hence, he was not entitled to copyright protection of his 
ideas.  This case blurs the line between the idea/expression dichotomy.  Determining 
whether there is “substantial similarity” requires the court to analyze not only the similar 
features, but all the differences.154  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit incorrectly 
concluded that there were significant differences between Attia’s schematic drawings and 
the defendant’s final design and thus was unwilling to conclude that copyright 
infringement had occurred.155 
¶53 In a factually similar case, Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates,156 the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court focused on the “substantial similarity” of the parties’ 
architectural works and reached a different outcome for the plaintiff.  In evaluating the 
merits of the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim of his architectural design, the D.C. 
Circuit’s analysis focused on whether the defendant’s architectural design was 
substantially similar to the protectible elements of the plaintiff’s design.157  Unlike the 
Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit does not favor summary judgment in copyright 
litigation, especially if the issue of substantial similarity is a reasonably close question of 
fact.158  Consequently, the court’s analysis included an evaluation of the “overall look 
and feel” of the two designs.159  Perhaps if the Second Circuit had compared the overall 
look and feel of the two designs, Attia would have at least been afforded his day in court. 
 
149 Id. 
150  Id. at 53-54. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 57. 
154 Id. at 58.  
155 Id. at 60. 
156 281 F.3d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  Plaintiff Elena Sturdza, an architect, filed a copyright infringement 
action involving an architectural design for the United Arab Emirates’ (“UAE”) new embassy against the 
UAE and Angelos Demetriou, the architect who subsequently was awarded the project.  Id. at 1292.  The 
UAE initiated a competition for the architectural design of a new embassy in Washington, D.C.  Id.  Both 
architects submitted a design but the plaintiff was selected as the winner.  Id.  After a series of unsuccessful 
negotiations between UAE and the plaintiff, UAE eventually hired the defendant architect sparking the 
plaintiff to file suit against both parties.  Id.  
157 Id. at 1295 (citations omitted). 
158 Id. at 1296 (citations omitted).  Summary judgment is appropriate if the protectible elements of the 
architectural designs are so dissimilar that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff on the question of 
substantially similar. Id. at 1297.  The Second Circuit approved of the district court’s analysis in filtering 
the elements of the plaintiff’s design that were unprotectible such as domes, wind-towers, parapets, arches 
and Islamic patterns.  Id.  
159 Id.  The court’s ‘substantially similar’ analysis was very comprehensive.  The court commenced its 
analysis in identifying the ways that Demetriou’s expression of architectural concepts mirrored Sturdza’s 
architectural design.  The court concluded that Demetriou’s design, although different in some aspects, was 
sufficiently similar with respect to the individual elements and the overall look and feel of the design.  
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¶54 More recently, in Rottlund Co, Inc. v. Pinnacle Corp.,160 the Magistrate judge 
declined to award summary judgment to either the plaintiff or the defendant on the issue 
of “substantial similarity.”161  Relying not only on Eight Circuit case precedent, the judge 
stated that, for purposes of determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the 
“substantial similarity” analysis involves both an extrinsic and intrinsic examination.162  
In fact, the Magistrate judge went beyond the Eighth Circuit case precedent by evaluating 
the opinions discussed above by the Second and the D.C. Circuits.163  The substantially 
similar analysis requires a court to first focus on the objective similarities in the details of 
the work, and if substantial similarly of ideas exists, then the court must further engage in 
an “intrinsic test depending on the response of the ordinary reasonable person to the 
forms of expression.” 164 
¶55 The judge concluded that a comparison of the plans revealed a similarity of ideas 
because the expression (i.e. the architectural drawings) and the subject matter (i.e. 
residential back-to-back townhouses) were similar.165  Consequently, it is the “total 
concept and feel of the work” that is critical for determining whether copyright 
infringement has occurred.166  The flaw of the substantial similarity doctrine with respect 
to determining infringement of an architectural work is that, for practical purposes, it 
involves comparing the architectural drawings of the parties and not the building 
structures.  Thus, the total concept and the feel of the work as required in copyright 
infringement action may be significantly diminished by using a two dimensional 
illustration of the three-dimensional structure.  It would be beneficial if copyright law 
could borrow some of the policy principles of trademark law and unfair competition in 
establishing parameters for evaluating whether the two works are similar. 167 
¶56 As discussed above, trade-dress protection is also a viable alternative for the 
diligent architect to protect the overall look and configuration of the building structure.  
Perhaps, architects can pursue trade-dress protection of architectural works in lieu of 
copyright registration or in conjunction with copyright registration.  Consequently, 
asserting trade dress protection of an architectural work may provide additional remedies 
for architects.  A likelihood of confusion analysis as required under the Lanham Act 
would favor a more comprehensive analysis than the substantial similarity test under the 
Copyright Act.  Instead of having courts pick and choose elements to compare, the 
likelihood of confusion test requires an examination of several factors.168 
 
Consequently, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. 
160 2004 WL 1879983 at 24 (D. Minn. 2004). In this case, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging 
infringement of technical drawings and architectural works as-built structures under §§ 102(a)(5) and (a)(8) 
under the Copyright Act.   
161 Id. at 22.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 23. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 14.  The court “filtered” the use of “gabled entries, lofts, or fireplaces” from Rottlund’s design 
because they represent mere ideas and not protected expression. 
167 Trademarks have a more stringent examination than copyrights.  It should also be noted that in most 
cases, the client or the building owner would be seeking trademark registration protection and not the 
individual architect.  Thus, many architects may be without any legal remedies if the selection, 
arrangement, and combination of elements in the technical drawings were sufficiently original to be 
afforded copyright protection.  Id. 
168 Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995); see also 
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¶57 An illustration of this discussion can be found in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Ale 
House Management, Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc.169  In this case, the plaintiff was an 
operator of a small chain of facilities selling food and beer in Florida.170  The defendant 
owned and operated a similar structure in Raleigh, North Carolina.171  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant violated its trade dress with respect to its exterior and interior 
appearance.172  In evaluating the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s trade 
dress was generic because there was no evidence of a unique or unusual configuration.173  
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit found insufficient evident to recognize valid trade dress 
protection to the interior of an ale house, but this holding should not deter an architect or 
copyright owner from seeking trade dress protection of his or her architectural work.174 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶58 Over the past fifteen years, the amount of litigation involving both copyright 
infringement of the architectural plans and building designs as well as trademark 
infringement claims relating to the building itself has increased.  As discussed above, the 
diligent architect should not be handicapped by a discrete facet of intellectual property 
law to protect his or her architectural ingenuity.  In determining which intellectual 
property protection is appropriate, an architect should evaluate the scope of protection, 
the duration of the protection, and the costs for obtaining the protection. 
¶59 In most cases, trademarks provide broader protection than copyrights, but 
trademark protection of architectural works may be more difficult to obtain.  Trademark 
protection lasts indefinitely, whereas copyright protection has term limitations which 
outlast the life span of the author.  Finally, the cost of a copyright application is relatively 
inexpensive and subject to limited review compared to the application process for a 
federally registered trademark.  The best protection should be determined on a case by 
case basis, but failure to take minimal steps to secure some form of intellectual property 
protection in the event an exact copy or duplicate of the architectural drawings or 
building design can have detrimental consequences and leave the architect with no legal 
remedies to adjudicate his or her claim.
 
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (articulating a seven-factor likelihood 
of confusion analysis). 
169 205 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 2000).  The owner of several ale houses filed a trademark infringement, trade-
dress infringement and copyright infringement against a potential competitor.  Id. at 139. 
170 Id. at 138. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 141.  Subsequent to the filing of this case, the plaintiff dropped its claim of trade dress 
infringement with respect to the exterior structure of the building. 
173 Id. at 142.  As discussed in regards to generic trademarks, trade mark law does not provide protection 
of a generic trade dress.  Id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768-70). 
174 Id. 
